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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARK STEPHEN MERILA, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 970107-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction for 
absconding, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-309.5(2) (Supp. 1997) (a copy of the judgment is attached 
hereto as Addendum A), in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake Department, Division I in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding. Jurisdiction 
is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2)(a) 
(1997) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the state 
presented legally sufficient evidence to establish that Appellant 
Mark Merila ("Merila") willfully changed his residence in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2) (Supp. 1997). 
Standard of Review: The first issue concerns statutory 
construction, which is reviewed for correctness, State v. 
Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996), and the sufficiency of 
the evidence, which is reviewed as follows: 
We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we 
conclude as a matter of law that the evidence was 
insufficient to warrant conviction. State v. Harman, 767 
P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989). Nevertheless, "the standard 
for reversal is high." Id. We will reverse only if the 
evidence is so "'inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime.'" Id. (quoting State 
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)); accord State v. 
Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985). We review from a 
perspective most favorable to the verdict the evidence and 
all inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence, recog-
nizing that determinations regarding witness credibility are 
solely within the jury's province. Harman, 767 P.2d at 568. 
State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1996). 
2. Whether it was error for the trial court to admit 
testimony concerning "flight" into evidence, and/or whether the 
trial court erred in failing to give limiting instructions in 
connection with the state's use of such evidence. 
Standard of Review: The second issue is two-fold. First, 
the trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance 
of evidence; the appellate court will find error only if the 
trial court has abused its discretion. See State v. Harrison, 
805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1991). Second, the propriety of a jury instruction presents a 
question of law which this Court reviews non-deferentially for 
correctness. State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362, 363 (Utah App. 1992); 
see also Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). 
3. Whether the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct 
in closing argument. 
Standard of Review: In assessing the prosecutor's state-
ments, this Court will make an original determination of whether 
the prosecutor brought improper information to the jurors' 
2 
attention, and whether such information probably influenced the 
jurors. State v. Troy. 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). If this 
Court views the evidence of guilt to be ambiguous or in conflict 
with other evidence, this Court will "more closely scrutinize the 
conduct." Id When objections are not made at trial, appellate 
review is under a "plain error" standard. State v. Palmer, 860 
P.2d 339, 342 (Utah A p p . ) , cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
4. Whether trial counsel rendered eonstituti- Tally 
deficient assistance. 
Standard of review: This Court reviews the record and 
determines as a matter of law whether procedural error occurred 
and further, whether the error affected defendant's substantial 
rights. State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170# 174 (Utah App. 1992). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Merila's first issue concerning sufficiency of the evidence 
was preserved in the Record ("R,") at 128: 64, 74-75. With regard 
to the second i.abue concerning "flight, " counsel for Merila 
objected to such evidence on the basis that :. was irrelevant. 
(R. 128: 50.) With respect to the third issue, Merila's trial 
counsel did : object
 r » ^*.cial comments 
during closing argument. The issue was not preserved but may be 
reviewed under the plain error doctrine. Palmer, 860 P.2d at 
3 4 z . "I. "he fourth issue r e q u i r e s i I o p r e s e r v a t i o n; :i t: :i s r e v i e w e d 
on direct appeal where the record is adequate. See State v. 
Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 & n. 3 (Utah App. 1993). 
3 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions 
will be determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2) (Supp. 1997). 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 2. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. 
Utah Const. Art. I, §12. 
U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached 
Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below. 
In July 1996, Merila was charged by Information with 
absconding, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-309.5(2) (Supp. 1997).x (R. 4-5.) The case was tried to 
a jury. (R. 41-42.) At the close of the state's case, counsel 
for Merila moved for a dismissal of the charge on the basis that 
the state failed to present evidence sufficient to establish a 
1
 The absconding statute was first enacted in April 1996. An 
amendment went into effect in May 1997 concerning subsection (1), 
which was not charged in Merila's case. Subsection (1) currently 
provides that an offender absconds from a parolee residential 
facility that is owned operated, leased, or contracted by the 
government when he " (a) leaves the facility without permission; or 
(b) fails to return [to such facility] at a prescribed time." The 
May 1997 amendment added subsection (1)(b) to the statute. 
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violation of the statute. (R. 128: 64, 74-75.) The trial court 
denied Merila's motion. (Id.) 
Thereafter, the jury rendered a verdict of guilty against 
Merila. (R. 42; 68.) The trial court sentenced him to serve a 
sentence ilot to exceed five years for the absconding offense. 
The trial court ordered such sentence to run consecutively with 
the sentence he currently would be serving for the underlying 
offense( •: ie was on parole at the time he allegedly 
absconded. (R. 69.) Merila is appealing from the final 
j udgment. (See R. 7 0; 7 7; 107.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Merila was charged with absconding, a third degree reiony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2) (Supp. 19 9 7 ) , in that 
o n c • :i : a b o u t J I I i i e 3 , ] 9 9 6 , 1 I e a ] ] e g e d 1 y w i I ] f u ] 1 y c h a n g e d h i s 
residence while on parole without notifying his parole officer or 
obtaining permission. (R. 4-5.) During the trial the state 
presented test d mony from f oi ii : i witnesses . Tl: ie fir st w:i tness, 
agent Paul Truelson, testified that he was responsible for 
supervising Merila's parole in June 1996. (R. 128; 28-29.) 
A c c o r d i n g t o T r u e 1 s c i l, I I e r :i 1 a w a s a "'"' j: 1 i a s e t: w; : •," • : • f f e n d e r, 
which meant he was on a less restrictive parole supervision. D 
128: 30.) In accordance with the conditions of parole, Merila was 
required to "report twice monthly Mi 11 I'u-1 f *.-i i ole office] His 
curfew [was] nine o'clock [in the evening]" and Truelson was re-
quired to visit Merila in the field twice a month, d 30.) 
Merila also was i equired t : • wear ai i ankle bracelet. ( : 31.) 
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Truelson testified that if a person wearing such a bracelet 
failed to check in at home by the designated curfew hour, 
electronic monitoring equipment at the house would notify an 
agent. "[The monitoring equipment then would] indicate when he 
[came] back into the home because the unit [could] read the ankle 
bracelet." (R. 128: 31.) 
According to the testimony, on June 3, 1996, electronic 
monitoring equipment in Merila's West Valley City home indicated 
that Merila failed to check in at the time designated as his 
curfew. (R. 128: 32.) On June 4, 1996, the equipment indicated 
that Merila came home at 5:00 a.m. (R. 128: 32.) Merila called 
Truelson that morning at 7:17 and left a message that he would be 
looking for a job that day. (R. 128: 38-39.) Truelson called 
Merila back at 7:45 a.m. but received no answer. (R. 128: 38.) 
Truelson testified that on June 5th at 10:30 p.m., he went 
to the residence and observed that Merila was not home at that 
time. (R. 128: 33, 38.) He also observed that the company in 
charge of the monitoring equipment had removed all equipment from 
the premises based on an indication that either the ankle brace-
let had been removed, or electrical problems in the West Valley 
City area had damaged the equipment. (R. 12 8: 33, 36, 37, 3 9.) 
Once the box was removed, there was no way of determining 
from electronic surveillance whether Merila was out past curfew. 
(R. 128: 36.) Truelson testified that he believed the electronic 
monitoring agents "would have" replaced the equipment; however, 
nothing in the record supports the determination that the 
6 
equipment was replaced since agents made no further visits to 
Merila's home. (R.,t 128: 37, 39. ) 2 
When Truelson went to the home on June 5th he met w.;:.. 
Merila's fiance, Jodean Johnson, (R. 128: 34.) Johnson lived at 
the West Valley r Ci ty address and confirmed that as of that date, 
Merila still lived at the residence. (R. 128; 34, 66-70.) 
Truelson searched the home and determined that in fact Merila's 
belongings were ther> I'P 128: 34. ~-;1 "hereaf ter, Truelson 
made no further attempt to contact Merila at his home, or to 
determine his whereabouts. (R. 128: 34, 3 9.) Rather, Truelson 
sent a letter !::c Johnson < - :- v' • stati i lg Merila w^- '..n 
violation of his parole 35; State's Exhibit 3.) 
The state presented no additional evidence concerning 
2
 Truelson's first recollection was that the equipment was 
removed because Merila tampered with the ankle bracelet. (R. 128: 
33, 36, 37, 39.) If the jury relied on Truelson's first 
recollection and if the jury determined the electronic equipment 
was "replaced" as indicated by Truelson, the agency would be 
required to provide Merila with another bracelet in order that the 
equipment would function properly. Thus, if the equipment was 
replaced and Merila was provided with another bracelet, the facts 
concerning the equipment support the determination that between 
June 5 and June 24, Merila reported home in a timely manner every 
evening. There is no indication that electronic monitoring 
equipment notified a parole agent that Merila stayed out past 
curfew after June 5th. 
On the other hand, if the equipment was not replaced or if the 
agency failed to provide Merila with an ankle bracelet, because 
Truelson did not visit Merila at any other time that month, there 
would be no way for Truelson to know from the equipment whether 
Merila reported home each evening prior to curfew. 
Either way, Truelson's testimony concerning the electronic 
monitoring equipment does not support the determination that Merila 
changed his residence. It simply reflects that Truelson had no 
information from electronic surveillance that Merila violated 
curfew after June 5th. The lack of evidence cannot support the 
conclusion that on or about June 3rd, Merila changed his residence. 
7 
Merila's alleged change of residence. Rather, the state's second 
witness, agent Harvey Vankatwyk, testified that he was aware that 
Merila lived with Johnson. (R. 128: 44.) Between June 4th and 
June 24th Vankatwyk spoke with Johnson and confirmed that Merila 
was living at the West Valley residence. Johnson also indicated 
to Vankatwyk that on occasion Merila arrived home late. (R. 128: 
45-46, 66-67, 70-71, 72-73.) 
Vankatwyk also testified that on or about June 24, 1996, he 
received a tip from Johnson's mother that Merila would be picking 
up Johnson from work that day. (R. 128: 40-41.) Agents went to 
Johnson's place of employment on 9th West in Salt Lake City and 
waited for Merila. (R. 128: 42, 50-51, 60.) When they observed 
Merila pull onto 9th West at approximately 5:00 p.m. in Johnson's 
car, they followed him. (R. 128: 42-43, 50-51.) 
According to the evidence, the pursuit lead agents south on 
9th West to a Flying J restaurant, then north on 9th West to 
California Avenue where the pursuit continued on foot and into 
the Jordan River. (R. 128: 43, 52-57, 60-62.) Agents apprehended 
Merila. (R. 128: 57, 62-63.) As of that date, according to the 
evidence, Merila was still residing with Johnson at the West 
Valley City address. The state's final witnesses testified only 
with respect to the June 24th pursuit and arrest. (See R. 128: 
48-64.) 
During closing argument the prosecutor made several 
statements that were not supported by the evidence, but were 
meant to inflame the jury. For example, while the evidence 
8 
reflected that Merila properly reported the West Valley address 
as liis residence and continued to live there during the relevant 
time period, the prosecutor stated, "it was not his house 
originally, It was not a place that he had before; it was a place 
thai: lie was1 staying while he was on parole, " suggesting either 
that Merila failed from the outset to report his correct address 
or he maintained a second residence. (R. 128: 88.) 
Th^ prosHi 'iil-or also sta* - *: !" iat if Adult Probation and 
Parole had gone out at almost any reasonable hour [during the 
relevant time period] looking for [Merila at the West Valley City 
address], I. because he wouldn't have 
been there." (R. 128: or- c:,... ;, a statement went beyond the 
evidence and misrepresented -.vie testimony. 
At: 11 le conelus io . " .-• .*\r s case f Iei: :i ] a asked the 
court to dismiss the matter since the state had failed in its 
burden to present any evidence that Merila had changed his re-
sidence. i'P, 128; i\4 , 'J '"> J ""r- ~ . . * - e t:ion 
and the jury rendered a guilty verdict . * *-~b, v 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah' s absconding statute j: a: ovides tl iat i f a p »a i olee 
willfully changes his residence without notifying his parole 
officer i obtaining permission, he is guilty of a third degree 
f e 1 ony. I. :i s c a s e, t1 - * 31 e c harged Me i : :i ] a wi t h abs condii lg 
on or about June 3, 1996. : J: presented evidence that on or about: 
the relevant time period, Merila continued to live at his 
reported residence'. The state also present »-'ii evidence that during 
9 
that time period, Merila allegedly failed to report to his parole 
officers and he failed on occasion to report to the residence by 
his designated curfew hour. The state's case arguably supports 
the determination that on or about June 3rd, Merila was avoiding 
parole supervision. Such conduct arguably constitutes a 
violation of the conditions of parole, but is insufficient to 
support a conviction for the offense specifically set forth in 
the absconding statute. The state failed to present evidence 
sufficient to support the conviction. 
The state also presented evidence that three weeks after 
Merila allegedly absconded, officers were informed that he would 
be picking up Johnson from work. According to the state's 
witnesses, officers watched for Merila outside Johnson's place of 
employment. When they observed Merila pull onto 9th West, they 
followed him in the car, on foot, and through the Jordan River 
where they apprehended him. The evidence of the pursuit or 
"flight" in this case was irrelevant to the charged offense, pro-
voked the jury's instinct to punish, was used for its prejudicial 
effect, and was not accompanied by limiting, cautionary instruc-
tions as required by Utah law. The evidence was irrelevant and 
prejudicial. It was error for the trial court to admit testimony 
of "flight" into evidence without limiting instructions. 
During closing argument the prosecutor informed the jury 
that if agents had gone to Merila's house at any reasonable hour 
during the relevant time period, they would not have found him 
there because he was not there. The prosecutor's statements went 
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beyond the evidence and were improper under the plain error 
doctrine, where case law and the professional rules of conduct 
prohibit attorneys from alluding to matters not introduced in 
evidence at trial. In addition, the improper statements had a 
prejudicial effect.. The trial court failed to admonish the jury 
that arguments of counsel do not constitute evidence and that the 
jury is to rely only on the evidence in reaching its verdict. 
The proseci itor s remarks were improper. Merila is entitled to a 
new trial. 
Finally, trial counsel for Merila failed to object to the 
improper remarks at trial failed to request limiting 
instructions concerning the state's use of "flight" evidence. 
Trial counsel's performance was deficient and prejudicial to the 
outcome of the tri^l. Meri 1 a was denied effecti ^  ^  ---" stance of 
counsel in violation of the state and federal constitutions. He 
is entitled to a new trial on that basis. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT MERILA 
"CHANGED" HIS "RESIDENCE" IN VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE. 
A. THE WORDS "CHANGE" AND "RESIDENCE" MUST BE GIVEN THEIR 
PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANINGS. 
In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, it is proper 
to identify the elements that make up the offense at issue by 
constr uirig tl le statute defining that offense See State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1215 (Utah 1993) (in considering sufficiency of 
the evidence, court construes elements of the offense of reckless 
m a n s l a u g h t e r ) ; S t a t e v . Smi th , »:.!'.' I1 Jd M "" „ t.fjl I Uf all App , iO Q6) 
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("We begin our [sufficiency] review by setting out the elements 
of the crime11); State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 358-59 (Utah App. 
1991); U.S. v. Cicco, 10 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1993) (in 
considering the sufficiency of the evidence, "[w]e will utilize 
the traditional tools of statutory construction in order to 
determine what conduct constitutes a violation of [the criminal 
statute]"); U.S. v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 109-10 (D.C. Cir. 1994), 
conviction reversed, 116 S.Ct. 501 (1995); U.S. v. Hollis, 971 
F.2d 1441, 1447-49 (10th Cir. 1992) (court considers meaning of 
each element), cert, denied, 507 U.S. 985 (1993); U.S. v. Levine, 
41 F.3d 607, 610-11 (10th Cir. 1994) (sufficiency of the evidence 
analysis necessarily includes engaging in statutory construction 
to determine elements of the offense). 
To that end, this Court is "guided by the rule that a 
statute should generally be construed according to its plain 
language." Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 
1989) .3 The statute at issue in this case is Section 76-8-
3
 The following cases support the long-standing rule in this 
jurisdiction that when the Court is construing a statute, the Court 
begins with the plain language of the statute. S .H. , ex rel. 
Robinson v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1996) (court considered 
the plain language of the comparative negligence statute to 
determine whether it applied to the dog bite statute); Carlie v. 
Morgan, 922 P. 2d 1, 3 (Utah 1996) (court looked to the plain 
language of the Utah Relocation Assistance Act to determine the 
scope of its application); Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy 
Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) (in 
determining whether statutory privilege was absolute or could be 
waived, court looked to plain language of the statute); State v. 
Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 53-54 (Utah App. 1996) (court construed 
warrantless arrest provision according to the plain language of the 
statute); Kearns Tribune Corp. v. Hornak, 917 P. 2d 79, 82 (Utah 
App. 1996) (court first considered plain language of statute, then 
(continued...) 
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3 09.5, absconding, which provides in relevant part the following: 
(1) An offender absconds from a facility when he: 
(a) leaves the facility without permission; or 
(b) fails to return at a prescribed time. 
(2) An offender absconds from supervision when he 
willfully changes the residence that he reported as his 
correct address without notifying his parole officer or 
obtaining permission. 
(3) Absconding is a third degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann § 76-8-309.5 (Supp. 1997); see note 1, supra. 
According to the prosecutor, Merila is the first person to 
be charged with violating Subsection (2) of the statute since its 
enactmen i April 1996 .) The statute does not 
define "residence" or "changes." Consequently, this Court must 
give those words their "plain and ordinary meaning." See Salem 
City , Farnsworth, 753 P,2c I 514, b^ "* - 988). 
The dictionary lists the following common meanings for the 
word "residence": 
la: the act or fact of dwelling in a place for some time b: 
the act or fact of living or regularly staying at or in some 
place for the discharge of a duty or the enjoyment of a 
benefit 2a(1): the place where one actually lives as 
distinguished from his domicile or a place of temporary 
sojourn (2): domicile 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1003 (1983). An 
instruction pr :>l: r:i cieci to t:l le ji lry in this case defined "residence" 
as follows: 
"Residence" is defined as the factual place of abode or 
3
 (. . . continued)!) 
legislative history where the statute could be read to have more 
than one meaning); Allred v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 914 P.2d 
1172, 1175 (Utah App. 1996); BB & B Transp. v. Industrial Comm'n of 
Utah, 893 P. 2d 611, 614 (Utah App. 1995); Mt. Olvmpus Waters, Inc. 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 877 P.2d 1271, 1273-74 (Utah App. 1994), 
cert, denied, 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994). 
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living in a particular locality. Residence simply indicates 
a person's actual place of abode, whether permanent or 
temporary and is accompanied with the intention to remain. 
(R. 58.) 
A separate Utah statute defines "residence" as meaning "the 
person's principal place of abode," see Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1-
105(41) (1994); and case law and statutory law provide that art. 
XIII, § 2(8) of the Utah Constitution defines residential 
property as that which is used for residential purposes as a 
primary place of abode. See Dennis v. Summit County, 933 P.2d 
387, 389 (Utah 1997) . 
The term "changes" as used in the absconding statute should 
also be given its "plain and ordinary meaning." In the context 
of Section 76-8-309.5(2), "changes" means to make an essential 
difference amounting to a loss of the original; or to replace, 
substitute, or exchange with another. See Webster's Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary 226 (1983); Black's Law Dictionary 210 
(1979 5th ed.) ("change of domicile" means change of residence 
and intention to remain). Thus, willfully changing one's 
residence means to replace the reported residence with another 
residence where one actually lives with an intent to remain. 
B. THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND THAT OTHER VIOLATIONS OF 
THE CONDITIONS OF PAROLE WOULD CONSTITUTE A SEPARATE OFFENSE 
UNDER THE ABSCONDING STATUTE. 
In this matter, Merila's Parole Agreement defined absconding 
as failing to comply with the following requirements: 
A. Reporting: I will report as directed by the Department 
of Corrections. 
B. Residence: I will establish and reside at a residence 
of record and will not chancre my residence without first 
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obtaining permission from my parole agent. 
C. Leaving the State: I will not leave my state of 
residence, even briefly, or any other state to which I am 
released or transferred without prior written permission 
from my parole agent. 
(State's Exhibit 2 (emphasis added); R. 128: 29-30.) The Parole 
Agreement is dated September 30, 1995. Section 76-8-309.5, 
enacted in 1996, makes a violation of the highlighted portion of 
the Agreement a third degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
309.5 (2) and (3) . 
The Utah Legislature has dealt with other parole violations 
in the following respects: In dealing with general violations and 
violations while on parole for specific offenses (i.e. sexual 
abuse offenses, rape offenses, kidnapping offenses, and/or 
offenses against children) Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202 provides 
that "any person who violates the terms of his parole, while 
serving parole, shall at the discretion of the Board of Pardons 
and Parole be recommitted to prison to serve the portion of the 
balance of his term as determined by the Board of Pardons and 
Parole, but not to exceed the maximum term." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-202(1), (2), (3) (Supp. 1997); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-
27-11(1) (Supp. 1997) (violations of parole conditions may result 
in revocation of parole).4 
In addition, 
When any parolee without authority from the Board of Pardons 
and Parole absents himself from the state or avoids or 
evades parole supervision, the period of absence, avoidance, 
4
 In 1997, amendments went into effect for Sections 76-3-202 
and 77-27-11. Those amendments are irrelevant for purposes of this 
appeal. 
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or evasion tolls the parole period. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(7). 
The legislature also specifically expressed that "leaving" 
or failing to timely return to a residential or treatment 
facility owned, operated, leased or contracted by a governmental 
entity for criminal offenders constitutes absconding. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-309.5(1) and (4). 
The statutory provision charged in Merila's case 
specifically provides that if a parolee "changes [his] residence" 
without permission, he has committed a separate offense. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2). Subsection (2) reflects the 
legislature did not intend that generally avoiding parole 
supervision or absence from the residence without more would 
constitute an offense; the statute requires proof of specific 
conduct. Likewise, mere curfew violations do not constitute a 
separate offense under § 76-8-309.5(2). 
If the legislature had intended § 76-8-309.5(2) to apply to 
other specific violations of the conditions of parole (including 
curfew violations, or absence from the residence without more), 
or avoiding supervision in general, the legislature was capable 
of expressing the offense in those terms. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-202 (general violations cause revocation of parole, and 
"avoid[ing]" "supervision" causes tolling of parole period); Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-11 (violations of parole conditions may result 
in revocation of parole); Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(1) and (4) 
("leaving" a government residential facility without permission 
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or nfail[ing] to return" to such facility by "a prescribed time" 
constitutes absconding). 
In identifying the offense at Section 76-8-309.5(2), the 
fact that the legislature did not use certain language (i.e. 
language used in parole statutes and/or in Subsection (1) of the 
absconding offense) reflects that the legislature did not intend 
that provision to apply unless the state was able to specifically 
establish that defendant actually and physically changed his 
residence and intended to remain at the new residence. 
In construing the plain language of a statute, this Court is 
required to avoid potential constitutional conflicts. See State 
v. Strombercr, 783 P.2d 54, 58 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Casarez, 
656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982). If Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
309.5(2) is interpreted to apply to evasions of supervision in 
general, and/or to penalize specific parole violations other than 
an unauthorized change of residence, the statute is in violation 
of the due process provisions of the state and federal 
constitutions. U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because 
we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and 
unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what 
is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws 
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. 
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be 
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those 
who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic 
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the 
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application. 
Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) 
%1 
(footnotes omitted); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
357 (1983); Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 
819 (Utah 1991). "No one may be required at peril of life, 
liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal 
statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State 
commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 
(1939) ; see also State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969) . 
To avoid constitutional conflicts, this Court must interpret 
§ 76-8-309.5(2) to require the state to prove that a parolee 
"changed" his "residence" in order to support a conviction for 
the separate offense. That is, the state is required to establish 
that defendant willfully replaced, substituted, or exchanged the 
reported residence with another residence where he actually lived 
with an intent to remain for an undetermined period. 
C. THE MARSHALLED EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT THE 
DETERMINATION THAT MERILA "CHANGED" HIS "RESIDENCE." 
This case concerns Merila's conduct as of June 3, 1996. (R. 
4 (Information alleged that "on or about June 3, 1996," Merila 
willfully changed his residence without notifying his parole 
officer or obtaining permission).) The evidence reflects that on 
that date Merila allegedly violated curfew. He failed to report 
to the residence before 9:00 in the evening. (R. 128: 32.) 
On June 4th, agent Truelson received a telephone call from 
Merila. Thereafter, Truelson went to the residence, spoke with 
Merila's finance, and confirmed with a personal inspection of the 
house that as of June 5th, Merila still lived at the address and 
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his belongings were there. Agents made no further inspection of 
the home after that date. The evidence fails to support that 
Merila had changed his address on or about June 3rd, or that he 
intended or was expected to leave his fiance and/or move out. 
In addition, Vankatwyk testified that he was informed 
between June 4th and June 24th, that Merila continued to live at 
the address; he was told that on occasion Merila arrived home 
late at night. Merila's conduct arguably may be construed as 
evading supervision, which would cause the tolling of his parole 
period and constitute a violation of the Parole Agreement without 
giving rise to a separate offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(7). 
Without more, Merila's conduct does not constitute a violation of 
the specific language of Section 76-8-309.5(2). 
The fact that Merila may not have been home when agents 
called twice or checked on him on one occasion after June 3rd, or 
that he arrived home on occasion late at night, does not support 
the determination that Merila willfully replaced or substituted 
the reported residence with another residence where he actually 
lived with an intent to remain for an undetermined period. Like-
wise, the evidence fails to support a reasonable inference to 
that effect. Merila's conduct does not give rise to willfully 
changing his address in violation of Section 76-8-309.5(2). The 
trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case where the state 
presented insufficient evidence to support a conviction. 
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POINT II • EVIDENCE OF PURSUIT OR "FLIGHT" IN THE CONTEXT OF 
THIS CASE WAS MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBATIVE; WHERE THE 
TRIAL COURT ALLOWED THE EVIDENCE, IT WAS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE 
THE JURY WITH LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS, 
A. EVIDENCE OF PURSUIT OR "FLIGHT" WAS IRRELEVANT. 
In its case in chief, 2 of the state's 4 witnesses testified 
to pursuing Merila on June 24, 1996, in his car, on foot, and 
through the Jordan River before apprehending him for allegedly 
"willfully chang[ing] his residence" on or about June 3, 1996. 
(See R. 4-5; 128: 48-57, 59-63.) 
Witness Charles Adler first testified in detail to pursuing 
Merila. (R. 128:48-57.)5 After Adler began describing 
surveillance at Johnson's place of employment on June 24th, and 
as he began to testify to the pursuit, counsel for Merila 
objected as follows: 
[WITNESS ADLER]: We saw Ms. Johnson come out of the 
business. 
[PROSECUTOR]: And after she came out --
[COUNSEL FOR MERILA]: Your Honor, if I may, I'm not 
sure what the relevance of this testimony is with 
respect to the charges before the Court. He's charged 
with absconding by changing his residence. I'm not 
sure where this is going in terms of relevance. 
5
 Vankatwyk also provided testimony concerning the pursuit. 
He testified that agents followed Merila to the Flying J 
restaurant, agent Shannon Miller ordered Merila from his car, 
Merila drove out of the restaurant parking lot, and Vankatwyk and 
Miller attempted to pursue him. Vankatwyk also testified that he 
arrived at the Jordan River as agents apprehended Merila. (R. 128: 
43, 46-47.) Merila's counsel did not object to the admissibility of 
testimony from Vankatwyk concerning "flight." Merila maintains 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admissibility 
of that evidence. See Points II.A. and D., and IV, infra. 
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THE COURT: Do you wish to respond? 
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, your Honor. I think it relates to 
the defendant's state of mind. 
THE COURT: Objection's overruled. You may continue. 
(R. 128: 50.) Adler then explained that as Johnson began walking 
north on 9th West, he observed Merila driving Johnson's car on 
9th West. At that point the pursuit ensued. 
The only facts Adler testified to that arguably related to 
"defendant's state of mind" involved the pursuit. The trial 
court improperly admitted the testimony concerning pursuit or 
"flight" into evidence. 
While evidence of "flight" has been upheld as a relevant 
circumstance to be considered with other facts as tending to show 
a consciousness of guilt, see State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 39 
(Utah 1987) ("We have previously ruled that evidence of flight is 
probative"), early case law reflects that flight from one offense 
is not relevant in establishing guilt for another crime. See 
State v. Crawford, 59 Utah 39, 201 P. 1030 (1921); State v. 
Whitney, 254 P. 525, 527 (Idaho 1927.) That is, where a 
defendant may have a "guilty" conscience for more than one 
reason, the fact that he fled from agents sometime later does not 
indicate a guilty conscience with respect to the specific offense 
for which defendant is being tried. Thus, the evidence is 
irrelevant. 
In Crawford, defendant was charged with burglary after 
officers found stolen items in a room that defendant shared with 
another. Crawford, 201 P. at 1030-32. He also faced a charge for 
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a separate robbery offense. In an attempt to prove the burglary 
charge the state introduced evidence of the items found in the 
shared room. Defendant argued that the evidence failed to support 
the jury's guilty verdict unless the state could present 
something else to connect defendant with the offense. The state 
claimed evidence of defendant's flight from being apprehended a 
week after the burglary indicated his guilty conscience, and 
together with the stolen items supported the verdict. The Utah 
Supreme Court disagreed and stated the following: 
If defendant had not been charged with another offense, and 
one more serious than the one for which he was tried and 
convicted, there would be more force in the state's 
contention. But the record discloses that at the very time 
he made the attempt to escape he was charged with the crime 
of robbery, the penalty for which may be imprisonment for 
life. In such circumstances the authorities seem to hold 
that no presumption of guilt arises as to the offense for 
which the accused is being tried. 
Id. at 1033. 
The Utah Supreme Court further explained Crawford in 
Franklin: 
In Crawford, we reversed the defendant's conviction because 
there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's 
verdict. In the course of that opinion, we were critical of 
allowing evidence of flight when it was the only evidence 
connectinr a defendant with the commission of the offense. 
59 Utah a; 45, 201 P. at 1033. That decision should not be 
read as holding that such evidence is never admissible. 
Franklin, 735 P.2d at 39. Likewise, Franklin should not be read 
as eroding the rationale of Crawford; where the state has failed 
to establish a connection between "flight" and the specific 
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offense at issue, "fight" is irrelevant.6 
In State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court reiterated that "flight" evidence was relevant and 
admissible where, as in that case, "evidence of flight was undis-
puted and consisted of the defendants7 running from the scene of 
the crime immediately after a police officer identified himself 
and ordered them to stop." Id. The Bales court distinguished 
the facts in Bales' case from cases "where the actual evidence of 
flight was slight or contradictory as to its motive." Bales, 675 
P.2d at 575. The court also acknowledged the United States 
Supreme Court's reservations about admitting flight into 
evidence. "We have consistently doubted the probative value in 
criminal trials of evidence that the accused fled the scene of an 
actual or supposed crime." Bales, 675 P.2d at 574 (citing Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 483 n.10 (1963)). 
I I I 
6
 The defendant in Franklin was accused of possession of a 
stolen vehicle in Kentucky and two murders in Utah. Franklin, 735 
P.2d at 35. He also was a suspect in some robberies. Id. at 38. 
During the murder trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of 
"flight." Defendant argued on appeal that he evaded officers 
because of the robbery charges, and that evidence of flight should 
not have been admitted in the murder trial. Id. at 38. The Utah 
Supreme Court was not persuaded. 
| The court recognized in Franklin that the state presented 
evidence connecting "flight" to the murder offenses: "During the 
trial, the prosecution called Detective Jesse Baker as a witness. 
Detective Baker testified that he had interviewed defendant in 
Florence, Kentucky, after defendant had been arrested there on 
suspicion of possessing a stolen vehicle. Detective Baker said that 
defendant appeared unperturbed by questions concerning the stolen 
vehicle charge, but became emotional when he was questioned about 
the Utah murders. During a break in the questioning, defendant 
escaped through a window." Franklin, 735 P.2d at 35. 
The state has presented no evidence in Merila's case 
connecting the evidence of "flight" to the absconding offense. 
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Here, the "flight" evidence lacked probative value. Merila 
did not flee "from the scene of the crime," the "flight" evidence 
was not consistent with willfully absconding, and counsel for 
Merila disputed its relevance at trial. 
As in Crawford, the state in Merila's case failed to present 
evidence that Merila committed the charged offense. Its proof 
arguably supported the determination that Merila merely violated 
parole by avoiding supervision. Thus, as in Crawford, if 
evidence of "flight" tended to show a "guilty conscience," 
arguably it was for violating parole and not committing an 
offense. 
The evidence of flight on June 24th is disputed, 
inconsistent and irrelevant where it does not consist of Merila 
fleeing the scene of a crime. It has no bearing on whether Merila 
intentionally/willfully changed his residence on or about June 
3rd. Consistent with Franklin, Crawford, and Bales, "flight" 
evidence in Merila's case should not have been allowed. 
B. TO THE EXTENT THE "FLIGHT" EVIDENCE WAS RELEVANT, IT 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS. 
In considering "flight" evidence, courts in this 
jurisdiction have recognized its prejudicial effect; a jury is 
inclined to infer guilt from the fact of flight. See Bales, 675 
P.2d at 575 (recognizing concern in federal jurisdictions with 
admitting evidence of flight since it suggests guilt); Franklin, 
735 P.2d at 38-39 (evidence of flight admissible where trial 
judge provided cautionary instruction warning jury not to give 
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too much weight to mere fact of flight without considering other 
motives besides guilt that may have influenced defendant); 
Crawford, 201 P. 1033 ("flight" evidence "was indicative of 
guilt" and therefore improper). This Court recognized that Bales 
and Franklin require the trial court to exercise caution, weigh-
ing all considerations, before admitted "flight" into evidence. 
See Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204, 205 n.l (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988) (Under Franklin and Bales 
evidence of flight "is circumspectly admitted"). 
To obviate the prejudicial impact of "flight" evidence Utah 
appellate courts have allowed such evidence where the trial court 
has provided specific, limiting jury instructions. 
In Franklin, the Court held, in a murder prosecution, that 
evidence of defendant's flight from custody was not 
erroneously admitted where the trial judge gave a cautionary 
instruction warning the jury not to give too much weight to 
the mere fact of flight without carefully considering the 
other motives, besides guilt, that may have influenced 
defendant. 
Fisher, 748 P.2d at 205 n. 1. If evidence of flight is admitted, 
it "must be accompanied by specific instructions." Id. 
In State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580 n.l (Utah App. 1988), 
this Court recognized that with evidence of "flight," the trial 
judge should advise the jury that "(1) there may be reasons for 
flight fully consistent with innocence, and (2) even if 
consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not 
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged." Id. 
(citing Bales, 675 P.2d at 575); Fisher, 748 P.2d at 205 n.l 
(Franklin and Bales require flight evidence to be accompanied by 
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specific instructions.) 
No such limiting instructions were provided to the jury in 
this matter. Attached hereto as Addendum C is the complete jury 
charge. Without the instructions, the trial court erred in 
admitting testimony concerning "flight." 
C. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CONSTITUTED PLAIN ERROR. 
Pursuant to well-established Utah case law it is plainly 
obvious that limiting and cautionary instructions must be 
provided to the jury in connection with the admission of "flight" 
evidence. Although counsel for Merila did not request such 
instructions, the trial court's failure to provide them 
constituted plain error. 
The plain error doctrine considers whether the trial court 
failed to engage in conduct that was required under the law in 
existence at the time of the act in question. 
In general, to establish the existence of plain error and to 
obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not 
properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: 
(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, 
i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased 
differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." 
See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Utah 1988); State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987); State v. Fontana, 680 
P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984); see also [State v. Eldredae, 
773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989)]; cJL. Utah R.Evid. 103(d); 
Utah R.Crim.P. 19(c). If any one of these requirements is 
not met, plain error is not established. Cf. State v. Hamil-
ton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992); Verde, 770 P.2d at 123. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
The first requirement in Dunn is that an error exists. 
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Merila maintains that factor has been met. This Court recognized 
that Utah case law concerning evidence of flight provides the 
following: 
The Utah Supreme Court has, however, addressed the 
admissibility of flight evidence in the criminal context. 
State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987); State v. Bales, 
675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983); State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596, 
236 P.2d 1077 (1951). In Franklin, the Court held, in a 
murder prosecution, that evidence of defendant's flight from 
custody was not erroneously admitted where the trial judge 
gave a cautionary instruction warning the jury not to give 
too much weight to the mere fact of flight without carefully 
considering the other motives, besides guilt, that may have 
influenced defendant. In Bales, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that it was error to instruct the jury that flight 
from the scene of a crime constitutes an implied admission 
of guilt and that a flight instruction "will not be 
completely free from criticism unless it advises the jury 
that there may be reasons for flight fully consistent with 
innocence and that even if consciousness of guilt is 
inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual 
guilt of the crime charged." Bales, 675 P.2d at 575. Under 
the reasoning in these two cases, it appears that, at least 
in criminal cases, evidence of flight is circumspectly 
admitted and, if admitted, must be accompanied by specific 
instructions. 
Fisher, 748 P.2d at 205 n.l (emphasis added); see also Howland, 
761 P.2d at 580 n.l (instructions to jury advise that reasons for 
flight consistent with innocence may exist and if consciousness 
of guilt is inferred it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt 
of the crime charged).7 Where evidence of "flight" is admitted, 
7
 The court in Bales did not reject additional language in 
the limiting instructions that provided the following: 
The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after 
the commission of a crime or after he is accused of a crime 
that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to 
establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proven, may be 
considered by you in the light of all other proven facts in 
deciding the question of his guilt or innocence. The weight 
to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the 
jury to determine. 
(continued...) 
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the trial court is required to provide the jury with limiting 
instructions. The jury was not provided with limiting instruc-
tions in this case. See Addendum C, attached. Error exists. 
Second, the error should have been obvious so that "a trial 
court can legitimately be said to have had a reasonable 
opportunity to address and correct it, even in the absence of an 
objection." State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989), 
cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
In considering the plainness of an error, the Utah Supreme 
Court has recognized that when express language in a rule or case 
law makes a specific course of action obvious to the trial court, 
failure to act consistent therewith constitutes plain error. 
State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1996). 
In Labrum, the language of a sentencing statute required the 
trial court to enter findings and conclusions to support 
application of the statute. Failure to enter such findings 
constituted plain error. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 940; see also 
State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1989) (trial court's 
failure to set forth on the record aggravating and mitigating 
factors pursuant to the requirements set forth in State v. Bell, 
754 P.2d 55 (Utah 1988), constituted plain error). 
In Merila's case, at the time the trial court ruled that the 
"flight" evidence was admissible, Utah law plainly provided that 
admissibility of such evidence hinged on the submission to the 
7(...continued) 
Bales, 675 P. 2d at 574. Utah courts have not mandated the provision 
of the additional language in connection with evidence of "flight." 
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jury of the limiting instructions. See Point II.B., supra; 
Franklin, 735 P.2d at 38-39; Fisher, 748 P.2d at 205 n.l. 
The trial court in Merila's case had a reasonable 
opportunity to address the matter when counsel for Merila 
objected to the "flight" evidence in the first place. In consi-
dering the effect of admitting "flight" into evidence, the trial 
court likewise should have determined that case law concerning 
such evidence focused on limiting instructions. See Point II.B. 
However, without regard for the cautionary language in case law, 
and the mandate that "flight" evidence be accompanied by limiting 
instructions, no such instructions were given. In accordance with 
the second factor set forth in Dunn, and pursuant to Labrum, the 
trial court's failure to provide limiting instructions as 
dictated by case law constituted plain error. 
The third requirement in Dunn also exists here. As set forth 
below, Point II.D., infra, the prejudicial effects of "flight" 
evidence should have been obvious to the trial judge. 
Merila maintains the error in this case is fully reflected 
in the record. The state elicited testimony from at least 2 wit-
nesses concerning "flight"; Merila's counsel raised relevancy 
concerns to the admissibility of such evidence enabling the trial 
court to reflect on its reasons for allowing it; Utah courts 
allow flight evidence when instructions limit the jury's use of 
the evidence; Utah case law requires the use of limiting instruc-
tions; the trial court specifically admitted testimony of flight 
without providing such instructions. Without limiting 
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instructions, the evidence was prejudicial (see Point II.D.). 
Where this case involves the submission of instructions to 
the jury, which is an issue that this Court reviews without 
deference to the trial court, State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362, 363-
64 (Utah App. 1992), this Court is fully capable of resolving 
this issue on appeal. It is enough to know that in connection 
with evidence of "flight," the trial court was legally required 
to provide the limiting instructions and it failed to do so. The 
case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
D. MERILA SUFFERED PREJUDICE WHERE THE TRIAL COURT ALLOWED 
"FLIGHT" EVIDENCE, AND FAILED TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY. 
Allowing the "flight" evidence without properly instructing 
the jury was prejudicial in this case where Merila's conduct was 
consistent with innocence on the underlying offense. The evidence 
arguably supported that Merila violated parole by avoiding super-
vision, which would cause a tolling of the running of his parole, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(7). The violations are a breach of the 
conditions of parole but do not give rise to the separate, 
specific offense. See Point I.B., supra. 
Because the state failed to establish a "change" of 
"residence," a reasonable likelihood exists that the jury would 
have reached a different result if the trial court had excluded 
evidence of "flight," or if the trial court had provided the jury 
with limiting instructions concerning the use of "flight" 
evidence. The evidence was admitted without the instructions. 
The jury likely convicted Merila based on an inference from 
the "flight" evidence that he appeared to have a "guilty" 
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conscience. A "guilty conscience" is insufficient to establish 
the separate offense. Without the limiting instructions the jury 
likely believed the "flight" evidence was a sufficient basis for 
conviction. The evidence should have been excluded. 
In the alternative the trial court should have provided 
limiting instructions to obviate the prejudicial impact of the 
evidence. The instructions would have advised jurors that 
reasons for flight consistent with innocence on the underlying 
offense may have existed, and "flight" did not necessarily 
reflect actual guilt of the crime charged. 
Because we cannot be sure that the jury did not convict 
Merila on the basis of the "flight" evidence alone, the error is 
prejudicial. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09; see also U.S. v. 
McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1120 (6th Cir. 1984) (record showed 
prejudice where evidence to support offense was disputed 
circumstantial evidence). This Court should reverse and remand 
this matter for a new trial. 
POINT III. THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT DURING 
CLOSING ARGUMENT BY MAKING IMPROPER STATEMENTS. 
During closing argument the prosecutor made remarks that 
called the attention of the jurors to circumstances that were not 
presented in evidence and that they were not justified in 
considering in connection with a verdict. Specifically, the 
prosecutor stated "that if Adult Probation and Parole had gone 
out at almost any reasonable hour [during the relevant time 
period] looking for [Merila at the West Valley City address], 
they wouldn't have found him because he wouldn't have been 
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there." (R. 128: 88.) 
That statement was not supported by the evidence, but was 
based in speculation. The evidence reflected that agents for 
Adult Probation and Parole went to Merila's residence once on 
June 5th and determined that he still lived there. In addition, 
Vankatwyk spoke with Johnson once between June 4th and June 24th. 
During the conversation, Vankatwyk was informed that Merila still 
lived at the residence but on occasion arrived home late. (R. 
128: 73.) The evidence does not support the prosecutor's remarks. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two prong test for 
reversals for improper statements of counsel: 
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so 
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case is, 
did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters 
which they would not be justified in considering in 
determining their verdict, and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced by 
those remarks. 
State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973); accord State v. 
Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984); State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 
48 (Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds in State v. Roberts, 
8
 The prosecutor also improperly suggested that Merila failed 
in the first instance to report his correct address. Specifically, 
he stated: "it was not his house originally, it was not a place 
that he had before; it was a place that he was staying while he was 
on parole." (R. 128: 88.) 
Although the trial court instructed the jury that Merila was 
charged with "changing" his "residence," the prosecutor's 
statements suggested Merila violated the statute by failing to 
properly report the address in the first place. The statements also 
suggested that Merila may have had a second residence. 
The inferences were not supported by the evidence. The danger 
of the improper statements was heightened by the fact that the jury 
was not provided with an instruction that counsel's statements do 
not constitute evidence. 
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711 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985); State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 
(Utah 1982); State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976). 
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing 
conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of differing 
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they 
will be improperly influenced through remarks of counsel. 
Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be searching for 
guidance in weighing and interpreting the evidence. They 
may be especially susceptible to influence, and a small 
degree of influence may be sufficient to affect the verdict. 
State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). As set forth below, 
the remarks called to the attention of the jurors matters outside 
the evidence; the jurors likely were influenced by those remarks. 
A. THE PROSECUTOR DREW THE JURORS' ATTENTION TO MATTERS 
THEY WERE NOT OTHERWISE JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING. 
The prosecutor's improper comments drew the jurors' 
attention to matters they were not justified in considering. His 
assertions mischaracterized and went beyond the actual evidence 
presented, indicating that Merila was no longer at the residence. 
The comments went to the heart of the case. "The insinuation that 
other evidence exists encourages the jury to determine its 
verdict based upon evidence outside the record and jeopardizes a 
defendant's right to a trial based upon the evidence presented." 
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah 1993) (finding plain 
error, but failing to find prejudice); see also State v. Pearson, 
943 P.2d 1347 (Utah 1997). 
In other contexts, the Utah appellate courts have reiterated 
that it is error for a prosecutor to allude to the existence of 
prejudicial facts where the prosecutor has failed to prove those 
facts. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786-87 (Utah 1992); State 
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v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah App. 1993) . Since the 
prosecutor in this case presented evidence that officers went to 
Merila's residence on only one occasion, his statement that 
Merila would not have been found at the address at almost any 
reasonable hour was not supportable. The comments were improper. 
B. THE MISCONDUCT WAS PLAIN ERROR. 
The Utah Supreme Court has identified the test for 
establishing plain error as set forth in Point II.C, supra. 
Specifically, the appellant must show "(i) An error exists; (ii) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reason-
able likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or 
phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09; Palmer, 860 P.2d at 342. 
Considering the first and second factors in Dunn, the error 
exists and should have been obvious to the trial court. Case law 
and the rules of professional conduct prohibit an attorney from 
alluding to matters not introduced as evidence at trial. Young, 
853 P.2d at 349; Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 3.4(e)(1997); 
Palmer, 860 P.2d at 343. 
The trial court in this matter heard Truelson and 
Vankatwyk's testimony prior to closing argument. The trial judge 
should have known the prosecutor's remarks were not supported by 
the evidence. See Palmer, 860 P.2d at 343. Since Truelson went 
to Merila's residence on one occasion during the relevant time 
period and Vankatwyk telephoned once, there was no basis for the 
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prosecutor's statement that if agents had gone to the house at 
almost any reasonable hour looking for Merila "they wouldn't have 
found him because he wouldn't have been there." 
Indeed, the converse of the prosecutor's statement rings 
true: A reasonable hour for a person to be home is early morning. 
If agents had gone out to the house at a "reasonable hour" they 
would have found Merila there because he continued to live at the 
West Valley address. When the prosecutor made his comment, the 
trial court should have been alerted to the error. 
The third factor in Dunn is also established. As set forth 
in Point III.C, infra, the prosecutor's improper statements were 
harmful. This Court may review the error on the merits where the 
record is clear and the law disallowing such remarks in closing 
argument is well-established. 
C. MERILA WAS PREJUDICED. 
Where the proof of a defendant's guilt is strong, Utah 
courts "will not presume the improper remark to be prejudicial. 
But in a case with less than compelling proof, we will more 
closely scrutinize the prosecutor's conduct." State v. 
Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402-03 (Utah 1986). Where the state has 
failed to present direct evidence of a particular fact that 
becomes the subject of an improper remark in closing, 
jurors are more likely influenced by an improper 
argument. In such instances, they are more susceptible 
to the suggestion that factors other than the evidence 
before them should determine a defendant's guilt or 
innocence. . . . In view of the highly marginal nature 
of any evidence of criminal intent or knowledge on the 
part of defendant, a reasonable likelihood exists that 
in the absence of the prosecutor's prejudicial 
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argument, there might have been a different result. 
Id. 
Likewise, if the jurors will be weighing conflicting 
evidence or evidence susceptible of differing interpretations in 
coming to a conclusion, there is a greater likelihood that they 
will be improperly influenced through remarks of counsel. In such 
cases, the jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing and 
interpreting the evidence. They may be especially susceptible to 
influence, and a small degree of influence may be sufficient to 
affect the verdict. Counsel is obligated in such cases to avoid, 
as far as possible, any reference to those matters the jury is 
not justified in considering. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87. 
As set forth herein, the state failed to offer any evidence, 
let alone direct evidence, that Merila willfully changed his 
residence. The jurors considered conflicting evidence or 
evidence susceptible of differing interpretations (i.e. the 
evidence of "flight"). Thus, the prosecutor sought to supplement 
the evidence with the improper remarks. While the effect of such 
remarks may be obviated by an instruction to the effect that 
"arguments of counsel do not constitute evidence and that [jury 
members] are to rely only on the evidence in reaching factual 
conclusions," Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1353; Young, 853 P.2d at 349, 
the trial court failed to provide the jury with such an 
instruction in this case. See Addendum C, hereto. The effect of 
the improper remarks was prejudicial. 
Since (1) the remarks in Merila's case were based on 
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speculation and matters not in evidence, and (2) the error was 
substantial and prejudicial such that in their absence there was 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for Merila, 
the remarks compel the entry of an order reversing the judgment 
and remanding the case for a new trial. State v. Hopkins, 782 
P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989). 
POINT IV. MERILA'S TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE. 
The sixth amendment and article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to 
assistance of counsel. The right to counsel has been construed 
to be "the right to effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970); accord State v. 
McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976). The Court in Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), set forth the proper test for 
determining whether counsel's performance was ineffective; 
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was 
so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death 
sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show 
that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result 
is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it 
cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that 
renders the result unreliable. 
Id. at 687; accord State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 185 & n.5 
(Utah 1990). Merila's counsel's performance was deficient as set 
forth herein. 
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A. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN THAT HE FAILED TO 
REQUEST LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE FLIGHT 
EVIDENCE. 
As set forth above, with respect to instructions limiting 
the jury's use of "flight" evidence, this Court has recognized 
that "evidence of flight is circumspectly admitted and, if 
admitted, must be accompanied by specific instructions." Fisher, 
748 P.2d at 205 n.l. If this Court is not persuaded that the 
language in Franklin, Bales, and Fisher compels the determination 
that failure to provide the limiting instructions constituted 
plain error, Merila maintains that in the context of this case, 
trial counsel's failure to request such limiting instructions 
constituted deficient performance and prejudiced Merila. 
Utah case law reflects concern with admitting testimony 
concerning flight into evidence unless the jury is advised that 
11
 (1) there may be reasons for flight fully consistent with 
innocence, and (2) even if consciousness of guilt is inferred 
from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the 
crime charged." Howland, 761 P.2d at 580 n.l. 
In light of the trial court's ruling admitting "flight" into 
evidence, the instructions should have been requested to remind 
the jury that such testimony does not necessarily support the 
determination that Merila was guilty of the underlying offense. 
Since flight was a substantial portion of the state's case in 
this matter and improperly suggested guilt, there was no possible 
tactical reason for failing to request the instructions. "[W]here 
a defendant can show that there was no conceivable legitimate 
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tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, the first prong 
of Strickland is satisfied." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 
(Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 
(Utah App. 1993)). 
Merila has been prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to re-
quest the limiting instructions. First, he has been convicted 
based on an improper use of prejudicial evidence where the jury 
was not advised of the limiting use of the "flight" testimony. 
See Point II.D., supra. Such testimony should have been 
considered with caution; the jury should have been given the 
limiting instructions. See Point II.B., supra. 
Second, even if the trial court had improperly rejected such 
limiting instructions, Merila would have properly preserved the 
issue for review on the merits by this Court. Because trial 
counsel failed to request the instructions, Merila has been 
forced to argue plain error on appeal. See Point II.e., supra. 
This Court can and should address the issue concerning the 
limiting instructions on the merits to alleviate this prejudice. 
Merila maintains that there is no conceivable tactical basis 
for failing to request the limiting instructions. The law is 
clear and this Court is able to resolve the issues in Merila's 
favor without further development of the record. 
B. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN THAT HE FAILED TO OBJECT 
TO THE PROSECUTORS IMPROPER COMMENTS. 
It should have been obvious to the trial court and counsel 
that the prosecutor's closing statements misrepresented the 
evidence. No possible tactical reason existed for trial 
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counsel's failure to object to the remarks, where they encouraged 
the jury to consider matters outside the evidence. 
Merila was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to object 
to the comments. First, the comments improperly provided a basis 
for the jury to convict Merila. See Point III.C, supra. Where 
the state failed to present evidence to support the determination 
that Merila willfully changed his residence, the prosecutor 
supplemented the evidence with improper remarks. See Point 
III.A.; (R. 128: 88.) 
Second, even if the trial court had improperly overruled an 
objection, at the very least it could have offered a curative 
instruction to the jury. Utah courts repeatedly have ruled that 
the effects of improper statements in closing argument are 
ameliorated by curative instructions. See Young, 853 P.2d at 349; 
Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1352-53 (curative instruction rendered 
improper statements harmless). 
In Pearson, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that although the 
prosecutor made improper comments in front of the jury, the 
comments were not likely to prejudice the outcome of the jury's 
deliberations where the trial court instructed the jurors that 
"arguments of counsel do not constitute evidence and that they 
were to rely only on the evidence in reaching factual 
conclusions." Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1353. Such an instruction 
would have been reasonable in this case. Indeed it is commonly 
provided to obviate the effects of statements that may be made 
improperly by the prosection. In this case, such an instruction 
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was not provided. 
Third, even if the trial court had improperly overruled an 
objection to the prosecutor's remarks, Merila would have properly 
preserved the issue for review on the merits by this Court. 
Because trial counsel failed to object, Merila has been forced to 
argue plain error on appeal. See Point III.B., supra. This 
Court can and should address the merits of the issue concerning 
the improper remarks to alleviate this prejudice. Merila 
maintains that there is no conceivable tactical basis for failing 
to object to the prosecutor's improper statements. 
CONCLUSION 
Merila respectfully requests that with respect to the first 
issue on appeal, this Court reverse the conviction on the basis 
that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to establish 
a violation of the absconding statute. In the alternative, with 
respect to the remaining issues, Merila is entitled to a new 
trial since the trial court failed to provide the jury with 
limiting instructions in connection with evidence concerning 
"flight"; the prosecutor improperly alluded to facts not in 
evidence constituting plain error; and trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance for failing to request the limiting 
instructions and failing to object to the improper remarks. 
SUBMITTED this 2Hi day of AJL^^UMJ^ , 1997, 
[NDA M. JONES LIN
Attorney for Defen^Ant/Appellant 
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D The motion of. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by^(a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea of np contest; of the offense of A W ^ Q & ^ Y A \ V \ Q L ^ , a felony f np 
of the _ i z _ degree, D a class _ misdemeanor, being nowbresent in court and r 
represented by J^L-Sf i f iSSO^and the State being represents by ^ . F ^ p ^ i X , 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
eady for sentence and 
is now adjudged guilty 
• to a maximum mandatory term of 
y^ not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
years and which may be for life; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $. to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with ^ ^ ^ _ 
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D upon motion of D State, • Defense, • Court, Count(s) *^-~ • *~" 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
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_\ate hereby (dismissed. 
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^ Commitment shall issue " A t * r \ y \ u S ^ ^ ,
 t , 
DATED this - | / - % y o f 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page 4_0f_L 




(1) An offender absconds from a facility when he: 
(a) leaves the facility without permission; or 
(b) fails to return at a prescribed time. 
(2) An offender absconds from supervision when he willfully changes the 
residence that he reported as his correct address without notifying his parole 
officer or obtaining permission. 
(3) Absconding is a third degree felony. 
(4) For the purposes of this section: 
(a) "Facility" means a residential facility owned, operated, leased, or 
contracted by the Department of Corrections or a county to provide 
housing, programming, or treatment of individuals who have been placed 
on parole. 
(b) "Offender" means a person who has been convicted of a crime and 
has been: 
(i) sent to a facility; 
(ii) placed on parole under condition that he report to a parole 
officer on a regular basis or that he serve periods of confinement 
during his parole period or that he attend classes or treatment as a 
condition of parole; or 
(iii) released for a period during confinement for work, school, 
treatment, or other temporary nonconfinement purposes. 
Art. I coNsnnrnoN OF UTAH 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are 
founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit, and they 
have the right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may 
require. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime qfraH have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XTV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. (Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held Illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK STEPHEN MERILA, 
Defendant. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CRIMINAL NO. 961901704 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant HARK STEPHEN MERILA 
is charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the 
commission of ABSCONDING . The Information alleges: 
ABSCONDING, a Third Degree Felony, at 6877 West 3170 South, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about June 3, 1996, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 3 09.5, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MARK STEPHEN 
MERILA, a party to the offense,did willfully change the residence 
that he reported as his correct address, without notifying his 
parole officer of obtaining permission. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
Instruction No. 1 is not to be considered by you as a 
statement of the facts proved in this case, but is to be re-
garded by you merely as a summarized statement of the allegations 
of the Information. The mere fact that the defendant stands 
charged with an offense is not to be taken by you as any evi-
dence of his guilt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
You are instructed that to the Information the defendant 
has entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not guilty denies 
each and all of the essential allegations of the charge contained 
in the Information and casts upon the State the burden of proving 
each and all of the essential allegations thereof to your satis-
faction and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
You are instructed that the mere fact that the defendant 
has been charged with this offense and has been held to answer to 
the charge by a committing magistrate, is not any evidence of his 
guilt and is not even a circumstance which should be considered 
by you in determining his guilt or innocence. 
^ -
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INSTRUCTION NO. C, 
It becomes my duty as judge to instruct you concerning the 
law applicable to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to 
follow the law as I shall state it to you. 
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that 
are presented by the allegations in the Information filed in this 
court and the defendant's plea of "not guilty11. This duty you 
should perform uninfluenced by pity for the defendant or by passion 
or prejudice against him. You must not suffer yourselves to be 
biased against the defendant because of the fact that he has been 
arrested for this offense, or because an Information has been filed 
against him, or because he has been brought before the court to 
stand trial. None of these facts is evidence of his guilt, and you 
are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of them 
that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent. 
You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in 
this trial and the law as stated to you by me. The law forbids 
you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, 
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Both the State of 
Utah and the defendant have a right to demand and they do demand and 
expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately consider 
and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, that you will 
reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such 
verdict may be. The verdict must express the individual opinion 
of each juror. 
INSTRUCTION NO. & 
At times throughout the trial the court has been called 
upon to determine whether certain offered evidence might pro-
perly be admitted. You are not to be concerned with the reasons 
for such rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them. 
Whether offered evidence is admissible is purely a question 
of law. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, 
the court does not determine what weight should be given such 
evidence; nor does it pass on the credibility of the witness. 
You are not to consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor 
any evidence stricken out by the court; as to any question to 
which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to 
what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the 
objection. 
INSTRUCTION NO, ^ 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he 
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a 
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
he is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State 
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty. Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is 
based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of 
proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates 
all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which 
reasonable men and women would entertain, and it roust arise from 
the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \ 
Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should 
reconcile such conflict as far as you reasonably can. But 
where the conflict cannot be reconciled, you are the final 
judges and must determine from the evidence what the facts 
are. There are no definite rules governing how you shall 
determine the weight or convincing force of any evidence, or 
how you shall determine what the facts in this case are. But 
you should carefully and conscientiously consider and compare 
all of the testimony, and all of the facts and circumstances, 
which have a bearing on any issue, and determine therefrom 
what the facts are. You are not bound to believe all that 
the witnesses have testified to or any witness or class of 
witnesses unless such testimony is reasonable and convincing 
in view of all of the facts and circumstances in evidence. 
You may believe one witness as against many, or many as against 
a fewer number in accordance with your honest convictions. The 
testimony of a witness known to have made false statements on 
one matter is naturally less convincing on other matters. So 
if you believe a witness has wilfully testified falsely as to 
any material fact in this case, you may disregard the whole of 
the testimony of such witness, or you may give it such weight 
as you think it is entitled to. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight 
of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses you have a 
right to take into consideration their bias, their interest in 
the result of the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof 
to testify fairly, if any is shown. You may consider the wit-
nesses1 deportment upon the witness stand, the reasonableness of 
their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want 
of it, their opportunity to know, their ability to understand, 
and their capacity to remember. You should consider these matters 
together with all of the other facts and circumstances which you 
may believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the 
witnesses f statement. 
INSTRUCTION NO. (V 
You are instructed that the defendant is a competent 
witness in his own behalf and has the right to go upon the 
witness stand and testify if he chooses to do so. However, 
the law expressly provides that no presumption adverse to him 
is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself 
upon the witness stand. If he is satisfied with the evidence 
which has been given, there is no occasion for him to add 
thereto. 
So, in this case the mere fact that this defendant has 
not availed himself of the privilege which the law gives him 
should not prejudice him in any way. It should not be considere 
as any indication either of his guilt or of his innocence. The 
failure of the defendant to testify is not even a circumstance 
against him and no presumption of guilt can be indulged in the 
minds of the jury by reason of such failure on his part. 
INSTRUCTION NO. (1 
In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss nor consider the subject of 
penalty or punishment. The Court and other governmental agencies are responsible for deciding 
those issue. Accordingly, the subject of penalty or punishment must not in any way affect your 
decision as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO. d 
Under the law of the State of Utah, no person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is 
prohibited by law and he acts intentionally or knowingly with respect to each element of the 
offense. 
One acts "intentionally" when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause a result. 
The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of mind and connotes purpose in so 
acting. Intent, being a state of mind, is not always susceptible of proof by direct and positive 
evidence, and must ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements, or circumstances. 
One acts "knowingly" when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Yh 
Before you can convict the defendant, MARK STEPHEN MERILA, of the crime of 
Absconding you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about June 3, 1996, in Salt Lake County, Utah, the defendant, MARK 
STEPHEN MERILA was an offender under parole supervision. 
2. That the defendant did change his residence, that he had reported as his correct 
residence, without notifying his parole officer fe obtaining permission^ 
3. That the defendant acted willfully or intentionally. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the essential elements of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if 
the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of said elements then you should find the 
defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. )*/ 
Your are instructed that a person engages in conduct intentionally or willfully with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. W 
An offender absconds from supervision when he willfully changes the residence that he 
reported as his correct address without notifying his parole officer or obtaining permission. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
"Residence" is defined as the factual place of abode or living 
in a particular locality. Residence simply indicates a person's 
actual place of abode, whether permanent or temporary and is 
accompanied with the intention to remain,, 
JSt 
INSTRUCTION NO. \Lf 
An offender means a person who has been convicted a crime and has been placed on 
parole under condition that he report to a parole officer on a regular basis. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \H 
In determining any fact in this case you should not 
consider nor be influenced by any statement made or act done 
by the court which you may interpret as indicating its views 
thereon. You are the sole and final judges of all questions 
of fact submitted to you, and you must determine such questions 
for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you 
believe the court thinks thereon. The court has not intended 
to express, or intimate, or be understood as giving any opin-
ion on what the proof shows or does not show, or what are or 
what are not the facts in the case. And it is immaterial what 
the court thinks thereon. You must follow your own views and 
not be influenced by the views of the court. 
\: 
INSTRUCTION NO. \ j 
The State of Utah and the defendant both are entitled 
to the individual opinion of each juror. It is the duty of 
each of you after considering all the evidence in the case, to 
determine, if possible, the question of guilt or innocence of 
the defendant. When you have reached a conclusion in that re-
spect, you should not change it merely because one or more or 
all of your fellow jurors may have come to a different con-
clusion. However, each juror should freely and fairly discuss 
with his fellow jurors the evidence and the deduction to be 
drawn therefrom. If, after doing so, any juror should be sat-
isfied that a conclusion first reached by him was wrong, he 
unhesitatingly should abandon that original opinion and render 
his verdict according to his final decision. 
INSTRUCTION NO, \ C\ 
If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea 
has been stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is in-
tended, and none must be inferred by you. For that reason, 
you are not to single out any certain sentence, or any individual 
point or instruction, and ignore the others, but you are to con-
sider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the 
light of all the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no 
significance as to their relative importance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 0 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of 
their deliberations are a matter of considerable importance. 
It is rarely productive of good for a juror, upon entering 
the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of his opinion 
on the case or to announce a determination to stand for a 
certain verdict. When one does that at the outset, his sense 
of pride may be aroused, and he may hesitate to recede from 
an announced position if shown that it is fallacious. Remember 
that you are not partisans or advocates in this matter, but are 
judges. The final test of the quality of your service will lie 
in the verdict which you return to the court, not in the opin-
ions any of you may hold as you retire. Have in mind that you 
will make a definite contribution to efficient judicial admin-
istration if you arrive at a just and proper verdict. To that 
end, the court would remind you that in your deliberations in 
the jury room there can be no triumph excepting the ascertainment 
and declaration of the truth and the administation of justice 
based thereon. 
INSTRUCTION NO. QA 
The court has endeavored to give you instructions em-
bodying all rules of law that may become necessary in guiding 
you to a just and lawful verdict. The applicability of some of 
these instructions will depend upon the conclusions you reach 
as to what the facts are. As to any such instruction, the 
fact that it has been given must not be taken as indicating an 
opinion of the court and that the instruction will be necessary 
or as to what the facts are. If an instruction applies only to 
a state of facts which you find does not exist, you will disre-
gard the instruction. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ ^ 
Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in 
courts of justice, upon either or both of which, juries law-
fully may base their findings, whether favorable to the State 
or to the defendant, provided, however, that to support a ver-
dict of guilt the evidence, whether of one kind or the other 
or a combination of both, must carry the convincing quality re-
quired by law. 
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other 
as circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between the two 
classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as 
to their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each 
for such convincing force as it may carry and accepts each as a 
reasonable method of proof. 
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in 
question consists of the testimony of every witness who, with 
any of his own physical senses, perceived such conduct or any 
part thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what 
thus was perceived. All other evidence admitted in the trial is 
circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, insofar as it 
shows any act, statement or other conduct, or any circumstance 
of fact, tending to prove by reasonable inference the innocence 
or guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in arriv-
ing at a verdict. 
INSTRUCTION NO . 33 
When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one 
of your members to act as foreperson, who, as foreperson, will 
preside over your deliberations. 
Your verdict in this case must be either: 




as your deliberations may determine. 
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all 
jurors is required to find a verdict. Your verdict must be in 
writing, and when found, must be signed and dated by your 
foreperson and then returned by you to this court. When your 
verdict has been found, notify the bailiff that you are ready to 
report to the court. 
\/j/fi 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah 
m. 
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